Deterrence: Iran’s return on its Hezbollah investment

Since the liberation of southern Lebanon from Israeli occupation in 2000, Hezbollah, the Islamic resistance in Lebanon has leveraged its imposed role as the cornerstone of the country’s defense strategy, bolstered by its deep ties to the Ayatollah regime, to grow into the largest security, political and cultural influence in Lebanon. Domestically, Hezbollah built its credibility by projecting the image of Lebanon’s deterrence against Israeli aggression, yet as Hezbollah’s tireless investor, Iran is the sole party in possession of the rights to utilize that leverage.

To fully appreciate the significance of Iran’s investment in Hezbollah, we must dissect the security-diplomacy dynamic Iran carefully balances: conflict creation and conflict resolution.

Iran’s ruling Ayatollah regime, which came to power through the Islamic Revolution, adheres to a hardline religious expansionist hostile ideology that seeks to challenge and undermine Western liberal democracies. As a result, it finds itself isolated, facing international sanctions, and viewed as unsustainable in the long term. To secure a permanent place on the international stage, Iran has heavily invested in regional security, creating a network of proxies capable of destabilizing the region when deemed necessary. Iran’s strategic play lies in its ability to harness these proxies by creating crises, then shaping conflict resolution efforts to its advantage.

Before the events of October 7, the Middle East appeared to be shifting toward new strategic alignments. Budding ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia were moving toward formalization, with strong backing from the United States.

To navigate overlapping strategic agendas in a complex web of interests, the possibility of separate bilateral defense pacts between Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States, akin to those with Japan and South Korea, was on the horizon, adding another layer to these emerging dynamics. This Middle Eastern “NATO equivalent,” designed to contain Iran’s influence and serve as a bulwark against Chinese interests, would also enable the U.S. to maintain influence in an oil-rich region while reducing its military footprint in the Middle East.

For Iran, the prospect of peace between its foremost adversaries threatens to undermine its influence through non-state actors and security-based means. Additionally, such an agreement would serve Israel’s objective of securing recognition across the Arab world. On October 7, Hamas, an Iran-backed militant group based in Gaza, launched an unprecedented attack on southern Israel. While Tehran’s involvement in planning Hamas’ operation remains undisclosed and ambiguous, its motives and involvement in managing the aftermath are not. Less than twenty-four hours into Al Aqsa Flood, a Western-backed Israeli war was declared with the stated objective of permanently extinguishing Hamas’s political and military grip over Gaza and end its role in the Palestinian-Israeli crisis by extension.

However, for the Iranian regime, which sits 2000 km north of Gaza, the conflict ushered in precious windows of opportunity. Iran has so far upheld an escalatory but cautious rhetoric, claiming uninterest in expanding the radius of conflict while threatening intervention via its axis if Israel’s attacks on Gaza are deemed “too aggressive,” without determining the threshold for its interference. Iran’s foreign minister has been actively engaging Iran’s allies and rivals through diplomacy, while pro-Iran militias have maintained low-level strikes on U.S. targets in the region and engaged in cross-border exchanges with Israel on the Lebanese border. A recent statement by Iran’s Foreign Minister suggested that Hamas is willing to entrust Iran with the negotiations for the 200 Israeli and foreign hostages in its possession.

In other words, Iran is playing a multi-tier game. If Iran’s deterrence succeeds in limiting the scope of Israel’s actions in Gaza, and Hamas could hold off long enough against Israel’s best efforts, Iran could claim a perceived victory as the global mood shifts against Israel, laying the groundwork for a post-war settlement that Iran could leverage for domestic gains. Alternatively, Iran could let go of Hamas but succeed in inserting itself into future regional security and economic agreements after proving capable of disrupting agreements it has no steak in.

This cautious balance between security and diplomacy underscores Iran’s evolving strategy post-October 7, which is geared towards safeguarding its regional investments. If that requires the sacrifice of assets like Hamas to secure gains closer to home, then so be it. If that means widening the scope of war to include southern Lebanon, then so be it. Ultimately, Iran’s objective is to carve long-term sustainability for an otherwise unviable regime. This means breaking out of international isolation and fulfilling a valuable regional role. Iran’s long-term security guarantees will not come from non-state actors that exist outside its controlled borders but from the nuclear capabilities it aims to attain. When it comes to deterrence, mutually assured destruction is as far as any regime can go.

In the interim, Iran relies on its regional proxies to buy time, secure buffer zones, and leverage its influence in preparation for achieving its broader interests. Unfortunately, the human cost and the sovereignty of states sacrificed in the service of this agenda do not factor into Iran’s calculus.

Hezbollah, operating indeed as an effective deterrent, exclusively serves the interests of a regime located thousands of kilometers away. If circumstances dictate that Iran must employ Hezbollah in a war of survival, dragging Lebanon into another destructive conflict, it will do so based on a calculated cost-benefit analysis. Iran’s decisions are ultimately driven by the perceived balance between its regional gains and the costs it must bear along the way.